| Title | Engaging stakeholders in collaborative control of air pollution: A tripartite evolutionary game of enterprises, public and government |
|---|---|
| ID_Doc | 31679 |
| Authors | Wang, JM; Jia, L; He, P; Wang, P; Huang, L |
| Title | Engaging stakeholders in collaborative control of air pollution: A tripartite evolutionary game of enterprises, public and government |
| Year | 2023 |
| Published | |
| Abstract | In the current context of air pollution control, inconsistent interest demands from various stakeholders hinder efficient cooperative governance. This study developed a tripartite evolutionary game model to examine the decision-making mechanism of enterprises, the public, and the governments involved in China's air pollution control process. Using theoretical and simulation analysis, the study identifies critical factors of stakeholders' strategies and propose possible evolution paths for achieving collaborative air pollution control. The results showed that collaborative governance among the three stakeholders is the optimal path for air pollution control in China, which evolves through four stages: government regulation, enterprises' pollution control, public participation, and government withdrawal. Currently, China is currently in a transitional period from public participation to government withdrawal and should focus on introducing subsidy policies to encourage green technology innovation among enterprises, strengthen environmental information disclosure, and establish and improve public participation mechanisms. In the future, China should prioritize the construction of public participation channels, incentivize green technology innovation, and focus on synergistic effect of carbon emission reduction among enterprises. This will help achieve the possible government withdrawal stage where joint governance of the public and enterprises can effectively control air pollution, allowing the government to shift focus to other important environmental issues such as carbon emission reduction. |
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