| Abstract |
This paper presents a stochastic differential game of green building technologies (GBTs) transfer from academic research institutes to building enterprises in the building enterprises-academic research institutes collaborative innovation (BACI) system. Some random interference factors, for example the uncertain external environment and the mood of decision makers, are considered into three models which are Nash non-cooperative game model, Stacklberg master-slave game model and cooperative game model. The equilibrium strategies of building enterprises and academic research institutes are studied and discussed by using feedback control. The equilibrium results showed that the effort level of academic research institutes and building enterprises is proportional to the government subsidy of GBTs innovation, and the level of credit support and tax relief is proportional to the effort level of academic research institutes. The government subsidy of GBTs innovation is a long-term incentive mechanism which can promote GBTs transfer from academic research institutes to building enterprises in the BACI system. The Pareto optimality of GBTs transfer system can be reached under a cooperative game model. To reach the Pareto optimality, the scope of revenue distribution coefficient is given by analysis of revenue distribution mechanism. This study will contribute to the GBTs transfer from academic research institutes to building enterprises by providing some incentive mechanisms and the scope of revenue distribution coefficient. The findings from this study also adds to theoretical basis of incentive mechanisms, random factors, profit distribution and contract design for building enterprises and academic research institutes to make scientific decisions. |
