| Title | How to select green technology acquisition paths for enterprises: An analysis based on evolutionary game theory |
|---|---|
| ID_Doc | 35474 |
| Authors | Ning, J; Zheng, Y; Yu, C; Li, ZG |
| Title | How to select green technology acquisition paths for enterprises: An analysis based on evolutionary game theory |
| Year | 2024 |
| Published | |
| Abstract | As an important method of reducing pollution, green technology innovation (GTI) is receiving more attention. However, facing the challenges in conducting GTI, it is crucial for enterprises to find the optimal path to acquire green technology. This paper investigates how high-pollution manufacturing enterprises make decisions on independent innovation and green technology introduction under government intervention and public involvement. The influences of other factors, such as media attention and product market competition, have also been considered in the tripartite evolutionary game model. The simulation after applying MATLAB indicates that government intervention and public participation have a significant impact on the decision-making of green technology acquisition paths for enterprises. Government subsidies and penalties are important policy tools for enterprises to make decisions on the selection of green technology acquisition paths. Meanwhile, reputational incentives or losses brought from public involvement are also essential in encouraging government intervention and green technology acquisition of enterprises. Finally, the extent to which the changes in various influencing factors affect the selection of enterprises' green technology acquisition paths have been tested and simulated. This paper aims to provide policy implications for governments, as well as decision-making strategies for enterprises that urgently require green transition to achieve sustainable development. |
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