| Abstract |
As an important way to realize the circular economy, remanufacturing faces the problem of low consumer recognition of remanufactured products. Given that factor, this study formulates a model that integrates offline direct sales with online distribution led by remanufacturers, assuming that consumers perceive differences between channels. We develop a Stackelberg game model to represent cases of remanufactured channel promotion and generic promotion and analyze the optimization of pricing and the level of promotion effort decisions for remanufactured products. Furthermore, considering the market conditions, such as the difference coefficient of consumer channel perception and the spillover effect in generic promotion, we investigate the selection of the optimal promotion strategy for remanufacturers. The research findings reveal the following: (i) Under channel promotion, the level of promotion effort and the prices of online and offline products are positively correlated with the difference coefficient of consumer value perception. Conversely, under generic promotion, the level of promotion effort and the prices of online and offline products initially decrease and then increase with the difference coefficient of consumer value perception. (ii) Under the generic promotion, the differences in prices between online and offline products are significantly smaller compared to channel promotion. (iii) The remanufacturer's profit from channel promotion is higher when the difference in consumer channel perception is either small or large. Conversely, when the difference in consumer channel perception is moderate, the optimal strategy for remanufacturers is generic promotion, thereby achieving a mutually beneficial outcome with retailers. This study provides a theoretical foundation for remanufacturers to formulate effective pricing and promotion strategies in dual-channel marketing, thereby enhancing the market recognition and sales of remanufactured products. |