Title |
A government value compensation model of waste recycling in an industrial park: A game theory approach |
ID_Doc |
18888 |
Authors |
Jin, YL; Tang, Z; Zhou, Q; Zeng, HX; Mo, SW |
Title |
A government value compensation model of waste recycling in an industrial park: A game theory approach |
Year |
2020 |
Published |
|
DOI |
10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.122976 |
Abstract |
This study establishes a game model of government value compensation for different types of industrial waste recycling in industrial parks and examines the standards for recycling firm waste based on maximizing government benefits. The impact factors of waste recycling, the government decision-making process regarding value compensation, and the firm waste-recycling decisions are evaluated, and a case study is conducted for model verification. The results show the following: the value compensation standard of the government increases with increasing waste-recycling cost and environmental benefits and decreases with decreasing waste disposal and raw material costs; a comparison of the equilibrium results of the government decision-making process on internal recycling indicates that the government value compensation strategy involving interfirm collaborative processing is better than centralized processing in industrial parks; government value compensation improves the reuse of firm waste and ensures more economic and environmental benefits. (C) 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. |
Author Keywords |
Industrial park; Waste recycling; Value compensation; Economic benefits; Environmental benefits |
Index Keywords |
Index Keywords |
Document Type |
Other |
Open Access |
Open Access |
Source |
Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-EXPANDED) |
EID |
WOS:000579495100069 |
WoS Category |
Green & Sustainable Science & Technology; Engineering, Environmental; Environmental Sciences |
Research Area |
Science & Technology - Other Topics; Engineering; Environmental Sciences & Ecology |
PDF |
|