| Title |
A novel game-theoretic model for waste management with waste-to-energy and compost production under government intervention: A case study |
| ID_Doc |
21593 |
| Authors |
Ghozatfar, A; Yaghoubi, S; Bahrami, H |
| Title |
A novel game-theoretic model for waste management with waste-to-energy and compost production under government intervention: A case study |
| Year |
2023 |
| Published |
|
| DOI |
10.1016/j.psep.2023.03.057 |
| Abstract |
Due to leachate contamination in groundwater and also soil, global concerns about improper waste management are today raising. On the other hand, with the emergence of the circular economy, increasing the recycling rate, reducing the landfilling rate, and producing by-products such as energy and compost from waste have become particularly important. In this regard in this paper, a chain consisting of a collector, a municipality, a compost plant, and a power plant is considered in a municipality-led Stackelberg game under government intervention. Indeed, the government supports citizens, the compost plant, and the power plant with subsidies to control the prices economically and sets penalties for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and leachate infiltration. The collector collects waste through two competitive channels: one from the city's trash bins and the other through buying recyclable waste from citizens, whereas each channel has its collection function. The municipality makes environmental efforts such as increasing people's awareness and investing in technology level to separate and treat leachate. The municipality also receives a fee from the collector for allowing the collection of recyclable waste. On the other hand, the compost and power plants produce compost and energy from waste and price their product based on the level of environmental efforts such as leachate treatment and GHG control, respectively. A real example has been finally implemented for the Tehran Waste Management Organization and the sensitivity analysis is presented. The results have shown that the source separation rate (72.36%) and the recycling rate (69.62%) of the ordinary waste channel are the highest and the landfilling rate (4.09%) is the lowest in the best government policy, which is environmental efforts compared to other policies; Moreover, the profit of the members is the maximum in this policy. |
| Author Keywords |
Waste management; Game theory; Circular economy; Energy; Government intervention; Technology level |
| Index Keywords |
Index Keywords |
| Document Type |
Other |
| Open Access |
Open Access |
| Source |
Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-EXPANDED) |
| EID |
WOS:000972520300001 |
| WoS Category |
Engineering, Environmental; Engineering, Chemical |
| Research Area |
Engineering |
| PDF |
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