| Abstract |
Green technology innovation (GTI) requires a large capital investment, while the role of these capital investments in promoting GTI needs to be further confirmed. To improve GTI, university-industry alliances (U-Is) in green innovation ecosystems engage in knowledge-sharing behaviors and form different knowledge-sharing strategies based on changes in cooperation modes. Employing a differential game, this study explores the utility of multichannel funding for innovation revenues in different cooperative modes of U-Is and the impact on revenue distributions. This article considers three game models in five cases: Nash noncooperative game with no multichannel funding, Nash noncooperative game with external funding but no government subsidies, Nash noncooperative game with multichannel funding, Stackelberg game, and cooperative game. Solving the game model and applying the numerical analysis results in certain interesting conclusions. Our research finds that, first, in the cooperative game, the strongest willingness to share knowledge occurs in the university-industry alliance, in which the total revenues of both parties reach the Pareto optimum. Second, multichannel funding can serve as an incentive mechanism for enterprises and universities to improve the knowledge-sharing willingness, the GTI level, and the revenues of the two players, while the utility of the multichannel funding is strongest in the cooperative game. In addition, in the Stackelberg game, enterprises share subsidies with universities, which stimulates their willingness to share knowledge, and both parties' revenues are better than they are in the three cases of noncooperation. Eventually, the revenue-sharing ratio of the enterprise has a smaller threshold, and the university can share more benefits relative to the absence of the multichannel funding, which helps balance the U-I in the green innovation ecosystem. These conclusions make a substantial contribution to the selection of cooperation modes and the formulation of revenues distribution contracts in university-industry alliances. |