| Abstract |
Under the subsidy and double credit policies, this paper constructs a competitive game model under the two situations of weak car enterprises without introducing technical service providers and introducing technical service providers, to explore the impact of subsidy threshold and dynamic integral coefficient on the green degree, profit, and environment of car enterprises' products. The study found that when the strong car enterprises do not adopt the high R&D investment strategy, the weak car enterprises will not adopt the high R&D strategy. When strong car companies adopt high R&D investment strategy, it is more favorable for weak car companies to adopt high R&D investment strategy than low R&D strategy. For weak car enterprises, their competitive strength is the greatest when they introduce technical service providers and both strong and weak car enterprises adopt low green product strategy; the competitive strength is the smallest when the technology service provider is not introduced and the strong car enterprises adopt the high green product strategy; in other modes, the competitive strength of weak car enterprises is related to factors such as R&D cost coefficient, points of standard models of pure electric vehicles, and unit recovery income. The increase of points of standard models will weaken the innovation vitality in the chain. The decline of subsidies is more beneficial to the weak car enterprises, and the strong and weak car enterprises can effectively deal with the decline of subsidies when they adopt the high green product strategy. |