| Abstract |
China's Green Building (GB) evaluation standard has always emphasized the use of Recycled Building Materials (RBM). However, the quality of RBM is a major obstacle to its promotion. Unlike previous stud-ies, this study innovatively developed a four-way evolutionary game model including Local Government (LG), RBM suppliers, developers and homebuyers, and examined their strategy changes from the produc-tion of building materials to the purchase and use of homes. This paper uses MATLAB 2021b software to simulate and verify the model and uses the real market data of Wuhan city and Sanya city to analyze the influence of some key factors among 23 factors such as the price of purchasing natural building materials P2 and the basic utility obtained by purchasing a house B. The results showed the following: (1) Among the four evolutionary stable strategies in this system, the optimal strategy combination lies when LG does not plan, manufacturers perform upcycling and when developers and homebuyers choose RBM. (2) High fines can force suppliers to perform upcycling, and developers will build houses according to homebuyers' preferences. If homebuyers are in immediate demand for homes, they will more willing to purchase homes built with RBM. (3) Considering the financial pressure of LG, it should promote the system in parallel with rewards and penalties in the early stage of development, while after a period of time, LG can stop making any subsidies and only retain the regulation of suppliers. This study helps to better under-stand the behaviors of various stakeholders in the full life cycle of RBM, and provides some reference for the development of RBM and GB in China. (C) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. |
